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We examine the trade credit linkages among firms within a supply chain to reckon the effect of 
such linkages on the propagation of liquidity shocks from downstream to upstream firms. We choose a 
sample appropriate for this task, consisting of a large data set of Italian firms from the textile industry, a 
well known example of a comprehensive manufacturing cluster featuring a large number of small and 
specialized firms at each level of the supply chain. 
The results of the analysis indicate that the level of trade credit that firms provide to their suppliers 
is positively related to the level of trade credit granted to their clients: when the level of trade credit granted 
to clients divided by sales goes up by 1, the level of trade credit provided to suppliers divided by cost-of-
goods-sold goes up by an amount that varies between 0,22 and 0,52. Since all firms along the chain are 
linked by trade credit relationships, an increase in the level of trade credit granted by wholesalers generates 
a liquidity cascade throughout the chain. We designate the overall increase in the level of trade credit 
among all firms in the chain as a result of a unitary impulse in the level of trade credit granted by 
wholesalers as the multiplier effect of trade credit for the industry chain. We estimate such multiplier to 
vary between 1.28 and 2.04. 
We also investigate the effect of final demand on the level of trade credit sourced by firms at 
various levels of the chain and, in particular, whether such effect is amplified for firms further up in the 
chain as a result of liquidity propagation via trade credit linkages. We uncover evidence of such 
amplification when the links of liquidity transmission along the chain are individually modeled and 
estimated. An unitary increase in wholesalers’ sales is found to produce an effect on trade payables among 
firms at the top of the chain (i.e., Preparers and Spinners) that is more than twice as big as the 
corresponding effect among firms at the bottom of the chain (i.e., Wholesalers).   
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1. Introduction 
Trade credit has long been a subject of interest to financial economists. At the theoretical 
level, various explanations have been offered to account for the optimal choice of trade 
credit made by firms. The empirical research has followed this lead, examining in detail 
the cross-sectional determinants of trade credit among firms.1 
 
Much less attention has been given to the dynamics properties of trade credit. Yet such 
dynamic properties are important if as a result of external liquidity shocks, the level of 
trade credit taken by firms takes extended walks away from their optimal levels. That is 
likely to be the case at least for small firms since trade credit is likely to be their major 
source of external funds. Indeed, for small firms trade credit may well play the critical 
role of a plug variable that balances firms’ cash position when hit by external liquidity 
shocks. 
 
We investigate this dynamic role of trade credit by empirically analyzing a set of firms 
linked through an industry supply chain. At each level of the chain, firms obtain credit 
from their suppliers and grant credit to their clients. Such a setup allows us to measure, at 
each level of the chain, the degree of transmission of liquidity shocks from clients to 
suppliers. Moreover, since all firms along the industry chain are linked by trade credit 
relationships, we are able to examine how shocks are propagated all the way through the 
chain, and compute what one may call the “multiplier effect” of trade credit for the 
supply chain. The multiplier effect provides a summary indicator of the effect of trade 
credit linkages on the propagation of liquidity shocks. 
 
A related issue of interest is the effect of demand for the industry’s final good on the 
level of trade credit sourced by firms at various levels of the chain. One well known 
result from operations’ management is the so-called bullwhip effect, which refers to the 
                                                 
1 Many theories of trade credit have been proposed; a few examples are: Ferris [1981], Biais and Gollier 
[1997], Brennan, Maksimovic and Zechner [1988], Burkart and Ellingsen [2004] and Wilner [2000]. 
Among empirical contributions, some salient examples are Mian and Smith [1992], Petersen and Rajan 
[1997] and Burkart, Ellingsen and Giannetti [2006]. 
 3
amplification of demand order variability from downstream to upstream firms.2 In the 
same vein, we want to know whether a similar bullwhip effect occurs with respect to 
trade credit. Specifically, we seek to answer the question: Do trade credit relationships 
cause firms further up in the chain to experience greater variations in trade payables as a 
result of liquidity shocks arising from shifts in the industry’s final demand? 
 
To address these issues we collect a large sample of firms in the textile sector in Italy. 
The textile sector in Italy is a well known case of a large and comprehensive industry 
cluster, featuring all the various levels of the supply chain. At each level of the supply 
chain, a large number of specialized companies – typically of small size and family 
owned - purchase industry-specific inputs from suppliers located at the next upstream 
level of the chain and sell industry- specific intermediate goods to clients located at the 
next downstream level of the chain. Given the small size of companies and the 
geographic concentration of the cluster, firms tend to maintain durable business 
relationships with clients and suppliers, encompassing the granting of trade credit to the 
former and the sourcing of trade credit from the latter. These characteristics of the Italian 
textile cluster make it an ideal sample to study the dynamics of trade credit in a supply 
chain. 
 
The empirical analysis shows that firms propagate variations in the level of trade credit 
granted to clients into the level of trade credit given to suppliers. Specifically, we 
estimate that a variation in the level of trade credit offered to clients (as a fraction of 
sales) equal to one yields an increase in the level of trade credit sourced from suppliers 
(as a fraction of cost-of-goods-sold) ranging  between 0.22 and 0.52 depending on the 
estimation method employed. This result is consistent with Banerjee et al. [2004] who, in 
their study of US manufacturing firms, find evidence of a casual relationship from 
accounts receivable to accounts payable which is robust to various methodological 
specifications. Moreover, taking the perspective of the chain as a whole, we estimate that 
a variation of one in the level of trade credit granted by wholesalers to retailers yields a 
variation in the overall level of trade credit in the chain between 1.28 and 2.04. These 
                                                 
2 See, for example, H.Lee, V., Padmanabhan, and S. Whang [1997]. 
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numbers show that the cascade of trade credit relationships within a chain has the 
potential to generate significant seizures in liquidity throughout the chain when 
downstream firms delay payments to their suppliers. 
 
As for the estimation of the bullwhip effect, we use a reduced-form and a structural-form 
approach too. Under the former, we regress the level of trade payables at each level of the 
chain on a proxy for the industry’s final demand; under the latter, we model and estimate 
individually the sequence of effects mediating the transmission of liquidity from 
downstream demand to the level of trade payables at successive upstream levels of the 
chain.  Although we fail to detect a bullwhip effect under the reduced-form estimation 
approach, we find it under the structural form approach. Our structural estimates indicate 
that an unitary increase in the level of sales made by wholesalers produces a negative 
effect on the level of trade payables among firms at the top of the chain (i.e., Preparers 
and Spinners) that is more than twice as big (in absolute value) as that felt by firms at the 
bottom of the chain (i.e., Wholesalers).   
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the most relevant 
literature; section 3 presents the sample and descriptive statistics of the data; section 4 
estimates the multiplier effect of trade credit; section 5 examines the bullwhip effect; 
section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2. Literature review 
To our knowledge, no research work has been done on the role of trade credit as a 
mechanism of propagation of liquidity shocks along a supply chain. Among existing 
research, the closest we could find to this subject are contributions that model and 
measure the impact of trade credit on the transmission of financial distress at the 
aggregate level of the economy. Here we provide a brief review of such contributions. 
 
Boissay [2006] develops a macroeconomic model of financial contagion across a network 
of firms linked by trade credit relationships, in which the default of one firm may cause a 
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chain reaction of defaults throughout the network. Firms are identical ex-ante, live for 
one period, invest at the initial date in a project with random returns and borrow from and 
grant credit to each other. When faced with a negative return on the project, some firms 
may be unable to repay their trade payables, thereby causing a negative wealth effect to 
their suppliers; these, in turn, may default on the debt due to their own suppliers thus 
propagating the shock. Boissay [2006] calibrates the parameters of the model with US 
aggregate data and runs simulations to assess the overall impact of the trade credit 
linkage on financial distress at the level of the US economy. His results show that a 
significant proportion of otherwise sound firms become entangled in financial distress as 
a result of financial contagion, yielding a non-trivial effect on the level of GDP. 
 
The model of Boissay [2006] draws on earlier unpublished work by Kiyotaki and Moore 
[1997]. These authors were the first to recognize that trade credit may propagate liquidity 
shocks within a network of financially constrained firms. Their model consists of a large 
set of small firms run by entrepreneurs who are unable to raise finance from outside 
investors, because they cannot precommit not to default, and because they don’t have any 
collateral to offer by way of security. Their only source of finance is trade credit, because 
suppliers can withdraw firm-specific supplies in case of default. These assumptions 
provide a set up in which firms simultaneously borrow from suppliers of firm-specific 
inputs and lend to clients purchasing firm-specific inputs. As in Boissay [2006], the 
authors investigate how a small and temporary liquidity shocks to some firms may cause 
a chain reaction in financial distress, thus generating a large and persistent fall in 
aggregate economic activity. One key finding is that it is bilaterally efficient for creditors 
and debtors to postpone delinquent debt, rather liquidating the assets held by the debtor. 
Hence, when clients fail to pay, the best choice for the firm granting the credit is to 
postpone the debt until clients have enough cash to pay it back, and seek alternative 
liquidity by defaulting on the debt taken from their own suppliers.  The upshot is that 
there is no diminution of the initial shock through the credit chain, because there are no 
liquidations to inject fresh cash. An important conclusion is that an economy with credit 
chains reacts more strongly and persistently to shocks than an economy in which the 
market for loans is anonymous on the supply side (such as in banking). 
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Building on the intuition of the model of Kiyotaki and Moore [1997], Giesecke and 
Weber [2006] propose a reduced-form contagion model to empirically measure the 
effects of credit contagion on the volatility of losses on large portfolios of financial 
positions. The analysis assumes a large network of homogeneous firms, linked by 
business relationships, borrowing and lending from each other in a credit chain, and 
facing identical exogenous liquidity risk. The local interactions between firms are 
modeled statistically using insights drawn from the basic voter model (see Zahle [2001]), 
which allows the authors to characterize the distribution of aggregate losses.  
 
Another line of empirical research has focused on the importance of trade credit over 
time, as a function of monetary policy and the economic cycle. Nilsen [2002] shows that 
both small and large but unrated firms use greater amounts of trade credit during 
monetary contractions. His interpretation for such finding is that in a monetary 
contraction, small firms and large but unrated firms are more adversely affected by the 
reluctance of banks to extend credit, and thus are forced to seek alternative credit from 
suppliers. Related results are provided by Jaffee [1971] and Duca [1986] who uncover 
evidence of the redistribution hypothesis advanced by Meltzer [1960], which asserts that 
when access to bank credit is tight (such as in monetary contractions), more-liquid firms 
pass funds via trade credit to their less-liquid clients. 
 
The review of the extant research thus confirms there is a gap on the literature concerning 





3. Sample and empirical methodology 
3.1. Data sources and characterizations of levels of supply chain 
The primary financial data is from the 2007 version of Amadeus (Analyse Major 
Database from European Sources) database by Bureau Van Dijk, updated number 15503. 
Several selection criteria were imposed for inclusion in the sample. First, only firms from 
Italy and belonging to the manufacture and wholesale of textiles are included. We follow 
the NACE Rev. 1.1, a 2 to 4 digit activity code developed by the European Union (codes 
1700 to 1772 – manufactures of textiles – and 5141 wholesale of textiles). Amadeus 
database provides 3,088 manufacturing firms and 606 wholesalers.  
 
[PLEASE insert Figure 1 here] 
 
Figure 1 shows the textile production chain. Manufacturing firms are divided in four 
distinct groups: i) Finishing textiles (NACE 173), ii) Manufacture of made-up textile 
articles, except apparel; manufacture of other textiles; manufacture of knitted and 
crocheted fabrics and manufacture of knitted and crocheted hosiery (NACE 174-177), iii) 
Textile weaving (NACE 172), and, iv) Preparation and spinning of textile fibers (NACE 
171). Therefore, firms with NACE 171 are the providers of goods to firms with NACE 
172, which in turn sell their output to firms with NACE 174-177 and so on.  
 
3.2 Sample Selection 
 
[PLEASE insert Table 1 here] 
[PLEASE insert Table 2 here] 
 
Table 1, panel A (wholesalers) and Table 2 panels A to D (Finishing of Textiles, 
Manufacture of textiles, Textile Weaving and Textile weaving and preparation and 
spinning of textile fibers) shows the number of firms under the successive steps 
undertaken according to the criteria selection in eight different columns. The first column 
presents the total number of firms that Amadeus database provides without any 
                                                 
3 For more information see www.amadeus.bvdep.com 
 8
restriction. There are 606 wholesalers firms, and 385, 1,248, 867 and 588 firms from 
Finishing textiles, Manufacture of textiles, Textile weaving and preparation and spinning 
of textile fibers, respectively. In column two, one excludes firm-year observations 
without any available information. With this procedure 25 percent of the firm-year 
observations were lost, on average. In addition, firm-year observations with blanks for: 
sales, creditors, debtors and cost of goods sold were eliminated (steps 3 to 6). Finally, 
when creditors and debtors are higher than the cost of goods sold (step 7) and sales (step 
8) respectively, are excluded. Our final sample features 24,923 firm-year observations, 
divided into 2,053 for the Wholesalers, 1,653 for Finishing Textiles, 4,988 Manufacture 
of Textiles, 4,261 for Textile Weaving and 2,831 for Preparation and Spinning of Textile 
Fibers. On average, the number of firm-year observations lost is 47 percent, with a 
highest value of 62.2 percent (wholesalers) and lowest of 46.0 percent (textile weaving). 
To reduce survival bias, firms are allowed to leave and enter the dataset over time. 
Therefore, the sample is unbalanced as there are more observations for some firms than 
for others.  
 
 
3.3. Descriptive statistics 
 
[PLEASE insert Table 3 here] 
 
In this sub-section the variables creditors over cost of goods sold and debtors over sales 
are presented. Table 3 reports descriptive statistics (i.e., mean, median, standard 
deviation, etc) by level in the supply chain and year. The results show higher average 
values for creditors over cost of goods sold than debtors over sales. However, if one 
calculates the relative magnitude of the two ratios excluding the first and last level in the 
supply chain, we find them to be quiet similar (e.g., 1.01, 0.99 and 1.1 for Finishing 
Textile, Manufacture and Textile Weaving, respectively). The number of firms in the 
sample steadily increases over the years. The reduction in the number of firms in 2006 is 
explained by the fact that at the time the data was collected some firms had not yet 
reported the information for 2006.  
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[PLEASE insert Figure 2 here] 
 
 Figure 2 plots the average creditors over cost of goods sold (thereafter COGS) 
and debtors over sales for different levels in the supply chain and years. The ratio debtors 
over sales shows a negative time trend across all levels of the chain whereas the ratio 
creditors over COGS shows no discernible growth pattern. As for their levels, the ratio 
debtors over sales is homogeneous across the various thresholds of the supply chain; in 
contrast, the level of the ratio creditors over COGS is significantly higher among firms 
from Manufacture and Textile Weaving. More importantly for the purpose of this paper, 
the ratios appear to move in a similar fashion over time for all levels of the supply chain, 
thus suggesting the transmission of liquidity via trade credit linkages.  
 
[PLEASE insert Table 4 here] 
 
 Table 4 shows the correlation matrix among CGS and Sales. The cells of the 
matrix report correlation coefficients between CGS, at each level of the chain, and Sales 
at further upstream levels of the chain. The diagonal cells correspond to adjacent levels of 
the chain whereas off-diagonal cells corresponds to non-adjacent levels, with the distance 
between levels growing as we move either to the right or up in the table.  
 
Except for Finishing Textiles, the correlation coefficients for adjacent levels of the chain 
are quite high (between 0.71 and 0.95), evidencing strong input-output linkages and thus 
giving us the assurance that the data is meaningfully capturing a supply chain.4  
 
4. Trade credit multiplier effect 
In this section we examine how trade credit propagates liquidity shocks along a supply 
chain. We use two approaches to estimate such effect: a firm-level approach; and chain-
                                                 
4 Given the low levels of correlation between firms from Finishing Textiles and firms from other thresholds 
of the chain , as a matter of precaution we also run the empirical analysis excluding the  Finishing Textiles 
threshold (thus linking wholesalers directly to manufacturers in the supply chain). The results are 
qualitatively the same and thus we don’t report them in the paper. 
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threshold level approach. At the firm level approach, we measure how the level of trade 
credit sourced by a firm from its upstream suppliers varies as a function of the level trade 
credit granted by the firm to its downstream clients; at the chain-threshold level, we 
investigate how the average level of trade credit sourced by firms at one level of the chain 
varies (over time) as a function of the average level of trade sourced by firms at the next 
downstream level of the chain. In either case, the presumed casual relationship is that 
liquidity shocks are transmitted from downstream to upstream firms, perhaps as a result 
of exogenous shifts in the level of the final demand faced by wholesalers. 
 
4.1. Firm level results 
The empirical analysis assumes that liquidity shocks borne by firms either originate from 
customers (as they postpone their payment of trade debts) or from the firm’s own 
operating activity (i.e., reduction in operating cash-flow). A firm bearing these shocks, if 
liquidity constrained, is forced to propagate them to its suppliers by postponing the 
payment of its own trade debt.  
 
[PLEASE insert Table 5 here] 
 
Table 5 regresses the trade credit sourced from suppliers on the trade credit granted to 
customers and operating cash-flow, using firm-level observations. Variables are 
appropriately scaled to account for differences in size among firms. We refer to this 
regression equation as the Within-Firm Liquidity Transmission Equation, because it  
captures, at the firm level, the transmission of liquidity shocks from shifts in the  payment 
patterns of customers and operating cash flow to the amount of funds borrowed from 
suppliers. 
 
At every level of the chain, the level of trade credit granted to clients is shown to have a 
statistically and economically significant positive effect on the level of trade credit 
sourced from suppliers. An increase in the ratio of credit granted to clients to sales of one 
percentage point yields an increase in the ratio of trade sourced from suppliers to cost-of-
goods-sold ranging between 0.13 percentage points among firms of level of Finishing 
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Textiles to 0.28 percentage points among wholesalers. In the pooled regression, the 
corresponding “average” coefficient for the entire chain is estimated to be equal to 0.22 
percentage points. 
 
These results are consistent with those of Benerjee et al. [2004] who, for a large sample 
of US manufacturing firms, find that the level of trade payables is negatively influenced 
by cash flow (i.e., Income before Extraordinary Items + Depreciation & Amortization) 
and positively influenced by the level of trade receivables. Both effects are highly 
significant. 
 
Using the estimates from Table 5 we may compute a multiplier effect of trade credit for 
the supply chain. This concept corresponds to the overall increase in the level of trade 
debt borrowed from suppliers along the entire chain resulting from an increase in the 
level of trade credit granted by wholesalers to retailers of one percentage point. Using 
individual coefficients estimated for each level of the chain, such multiplier may be 








If instead we use the “average” coefficient for the chain from the pooled regression, the 
estimated multiplier is equal to: 
 
M2 = 1.280.220.220.220.220.221 5432 =+++++  
 
Table 5 also shows that operating profits have a significant negative effect on trade 
credit, thus suggesting that liquidity shocks stemming from shifts in the level of operating 
cash flow are transmitted to suppliers via trade credit as well. 
 
The regressions in Table 5 are based on the levels of the variables. Since the data set is 
the panel type, the coefficients might be capturing cross-sectional effects (i.e., effects 
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stemming from the cross-sectional distribution of trade credit among firms) rather than 
the dynamic effects we are seeking to measure. To make sure that the coefficients are 
reflecting the time-series properties of trade credit, we run again the regressions of Table 
5 using changes in the variables from their previous year rather than their levels. The 
results are reported in Table 6.  
 
[PLEASE insert Table 6 here] 
 
Table 6 shows that, at every level of the chain, a change in the level of credit granted to 
clients yields a strong positive change in the level of trade credit borrowed from 
suppliers; a change in the level of operating profits, on the other hand, is associated with 
a negative change in the level of trade credit. Inspection of the coefficients shows that the 
estimates of the multiplier effect are even bigger than those indicated by Table 5: if we 
compute the multiplier effect of trade credit using threshold-level regressions we obtain 
the estimate 
 
M3 = 1+ 0,32 + 0,32X0,31 + 0,32X0,31X0,38 + 0,32X0,31X0,38X0,48 + 
0,32X0,31X0,38X0,48X0,38 = 1.48 
 
Alternatively, using the “average” coefficient from the pooled regression we obtain 
 
1.630.390.390.390.390.391  M4 5432 =+++++=  
 
We further investigate whether the transmission of shocks along the chain depends on the 
access of firms to other sources of short-term liquidity such as bank debt. Firm size is 
likely to be a good measure of firm’s access to such sources.5  
 
                                                 
5 The level of cash and marketable securities, which one might consider as an alternative proxy for the 
firm’s access to sources of short-term funds other than trade credit is an endogenous variable, chosen by the 
firm taking into account its ability to tap bank debt, at a reasonable cost, on a short notice; firms with high 
liquidity balances may actually be those that are screened out of bank financing. 
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To test the conjecture that access to bank debt mitigates the liquidity contagion effect of 
trade credit, we rank firms by size using volume of sales. At each level of the supply 
chain, two subgroups are selected for analysis: the bottom quartile and the upper quartile 
of the size distribution. Table 7 replicates the regressions of Table 5 for these two 
extreme size quartiles. 
 
[PLEASE insert Table 7 here] 
 
 
In general the coefficients in Table 7 are bigger (in absolute value) and more significant 
among small firms. The R2 are also bigger for small firms at every level of the supply 
chain. The pooled regression further confirms these results. Overall we find evidence that 
the simple empirical model of liquidity transmission from downstream to upstream firms 
via trade credit is more appropriate for small firms, as conjectured.  
 
 
4.2. Chain-threshold level results 
An alternative approach explored in this section is to see how the average level of trade 
credit at one level of the chain varies as a function of (1) the average level of operating 
cash flow at that very same level of the chain and (2) the average level of trade credit at 
the next downstream level of the chain. This approach captures the chain-level equivalent  
to the firm-level propagation of liquidity relationship – i.e., what we refer to as the 
Within-Firm Liquidity Transmission Equation - reported in Table 5. The results are 
shown in Table 8. 
 
[PLEASE insert Table 8 here] 
 
We can see that the average level of trade credit at one level of the chain significantly 
impacts the average level of trade credit at the next upstream level of the chain; although 
the regressions for individual thresholds have only nine observations each, three out of 
four exhibit a significantly positive slope coefficient. The pooled regression further 
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confirms the strong positive relationship between the average levels of trade credit at 
adjacent thresholds of the chain. The effect of the average operating cash-flow, however, 
has the predicted sign but is only marginally significant. 
 
Taking as a reference the pooled regression, we may compute yet another estimate of the 
multiplier effect of trade credit as: 
 
2.040.520.520.520.520.521M5 5432 =+++++=  
 
The range of estimated multipliers suggests that as the level of trade credit sourced by 
retailers from wholesalers goes up by one (as a fraction of CGS), the overall amount of 
trade credit along the chain goes up by a minimum of 1,28 to a maximum of 2,04. These 
numbers indicate that trade credit plays an economically significant role in the 
propagation of liquidity shocks within supply chains. 
 
 
5. The bullwhip effect in trade credit 
5.1. Structural versus reduced form estimation 
Our second line of investigation gauges how a demand shock to the industry – i.e., a 
shock to the level of demand faced by wholesalers that ripples through the chain 
impacting demand at successive upstream levels of the chain – affects the amount of 
trade credit sourced by firms at each level of the chain. Our concern is to determine 
whether trade credit relationships amplify or mitigate the liquidity effects resulting from 
shocks to final demand. One well known result from operations is the so-called bullwhip 
effect, which refers to the amplification of demand order variability from downstream to 
upstream firms. In the same vein, we want to know whether a bullwhip effect of a similar 
sort occurs with respect to trade credit. 
 
To assess empirically the effect of final demand on the level of trade payables throughout 
the supply chain one may either adopt a “reduced form” or a “structural form” approach. 
Under the former one simply regresses the amount of trade payables at each level of the 
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chain on some proxy for final demand; the bullwhip effect, in this case, would manifest 
itself by a tendency of the estimated coefficients to increase as one moves further away 
from downstream demand.  
 
Under a “structural form” approach, in contrast, one seeks to identify and estimate the 
individual equations that capture the “structural” links in the sequence of relationships 
that connect the level of trade credit at each level of the chain to the industry’s final 
demand. Under this approach, one would find evidence of the bullwhip effect if the 
estimated coefficients from the structural equations, once suitably interacted to capture 
the sequence of effects mediating the initial exogenous shift in final demand and its final 
impact on trade payables, show an amplification of impact further up in the chain. 
 
Of course, under suitable conditions, the reduced form and the structural approach should 
yield similar conclusions. However, given the limitations of our sample, the reduced form 
approach is likely to perform poorer in detecting the bullwhip effect. There are several 
reasons to think so. First, since each link of causality in the sequence of effects is itself 
noisy, the estimated coefficients of the reduced form will be subjected to large estimation 
errors due to the collective noise resulting from the long chain of causality embedded in 
the reduced form specification. 
 
Second, the effects take time to propagate throughout the chain. For example, a negative 
shock to final demand is first felt by wholesalers, who then react by reducing orders and 
delaying payments to their suppliers (i.e., the finishers). The finishers, in turn, feeling the 
pinch from reduced orders and delayed payments from clients, transmit the negative 
shock to manufacturers, cutting down their orders and postponing payments. And so on 
until we reach the top of the chain. Hence, as we move further upstream in the chain the 
impact of a shift in final demand on trade credit takes longer to be felt. Moreover, since 
firms react and propagate stimuli at different speeds, the effect seeps in the data gradually 
over time thus diluting its punch.  
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Finally, the supply chain featured in this paper has substantial “leaks” to external trade – 
i.e., firms sell both to Italian and non-Italian clients and buy from Italian and non-Italian 
suppliers as well – which tends to attenuate the propagation of demand shocks throughout 
the chain among sample firms (which are all Italian). As we later show, this effect will 
tend to be more severe among firms further up in the chain since more leaks to external 
trade will tend to occur between their own sales and sales made by wholesalers.  
 
In sum, all three arguments suggest that a reduced form approach to test the relationship 
between the level of trade credit sourced  by firms from their suppliers and the level of 
final demand features an increasing downward bias in the estimated coefficients – vis-à-
vis the true coefficients – as one moves upstream in the supply chain. This tendency 
works against the detection of the bullwhip effect, which predicts an amplification in the 
estimated coefficients. The estimated coefficients will thus reflect the countervailing 
influences of the bullwhip effect and the downward bias inherent to the estimation 
approach. 
Table 9 reports the results from the “reduced form” approach. Panel A features the firm-
level regression:  
 
(Trade Payables/Cost of Goods Sold)firm i, level k, year t =   
α +β1 Average Sales of Wholesalersyear t + β2 k Average Sales of Wholesalersyear t + u    (1) 
 
[PLEASE insert Table 9, panel A here] 
 
whereas panel B reports the corresponding chain-level regression: 
 
Average Trade Payableslevel k, year t =   
α +β1 Average Sales of Wholesalersyear t + β2 k Average Sales of Wholesalersyear t + u    (2) 
 
[PLEASE insert Table 9, panel B here] 
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In this specification, k is an integer variable measuring the distance between the firm and 
the level of demand faced by wholesalers. The variables “Average Sales of Wholesalers” 
and “Average Trade Payables” are indexed to mitigate scale effects, taking a value equal 
to 100 in the year 2000.   
 
The evidence from both panels is consistent with a negative effect of final demand on 
trade credit sourced by firms from suppliers, that is attenuated as we move upstream in 
the supply chain. For firms furthest upstream in the chain (code 171, Preparation and 
spinning), the effect of final demand on trade credit is indistinguishable from zero. We 
interpret this result as evidence that the attenuation bias induced by the “reduced form” 
approach dominates the bullwhip effect. As we will see next, the evidence gathered from 
the “structural” equation approach supports such interpretation. 
 
5.2. The structural equation approach 
To carry out a structural estimation of the bullwhip effect one has first to identify the 
chain of structural relationships linking the final demand faced by wholesalers to the 
level of trade credit sourced from suppliers at each level of the chain. Figure 3 represents 
the various channels through which final demand impacts on trade credit. In this 
representation, final demand impacts the level of trade credit sourced by firm i, located at 
level K of the chain, through two distinct channels: 
 
[PLEASE insert Figure 3, here] 
 
1. Demand channel 
A shift in the final demand (k=0) impacts the demand faced by firms in level k=1 of the 
supply chain, which in turn impacts de demand faced by firms in level k=2 of the chain, 
and so on, until it hits the demand faced by firms in the level K; the shift in demand 
experienced by level-K firms is then transmitted to the operating cash flow of firm i (and 
to all other firms at level K); finally, firm i accelerates or delays payments to suppliers in 
response to the variation in its operating cash flow. 
2. Trade credit channel 
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Firms make a further adjustment to the level of trade credit sourced from suppliers in 
response to shifts in the payment  patterns of clients arising from the demand channel. 
 
To model the two channels of influence of final demand on trade credit, we consider the 
following set of structural equations: 
 
 Output- Imput Demand Transmission Equation 
Demand faced by firms (level k, year t) = a0+b0* Demand faced by firms (level k-1, year t)                (3) 
 
Demand - Operating Cash Flow Transmission Equation 
Operating Cash Flow of firm i (level k, period t) = a1+b1* Demand faced by firms (level k, year t)      (4) 
 
Within-Firm Liquidity Transmission Equation 
Trade Credit sourced from suppliers by firm i (level k, year t) = a2 + b2*Trade Credit granted  
to clients by firm i (level k,year t) + c2*Operating Cash Flow of firm i (level k,year t)                          (5) 
 
The first two equations pertain solely to the demand channel. The last equation captures 
the last link of causality in the demand channel (i.e., the effect of operating cash flow on 
trade payables) and the trade credit channel.  
 
To fit equations (3) and (4) we need a proxy for the level of demand faced by firms at 
level k of the chain, in sample year t. Two possible proxies are the “average level of sales 
among firms of level k, in year t” and the “average level of Cost of Goods Sold among 
firms in level k-1 (i.e., firms at the next downstream level of the chain), in year t”. We 
report results based on Sales although they don’t change if we use Cost of Goods Sold 
instead. To measure Operating Cash Flow in equation (4) we use, as we did in the 
previous section, firms’ EBITDA. Equation (5) has already been fitted in the previous 
section (see Table 5 for firm-level results and Table 8 for chain-level results). 
 
[PLEASE insert Figure 4, Panel A here] 
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Because firms only report their total sales and purchases (i.e., they don’t discriminate the 
foreign and domestic components of their sales and purchases), the estimation of the 
Output-Imput Demand Transmission equation will tend to underestimate the propagation 
of demand shocks across successive layers of the chain. To see this, consider the 
following numerical example. Suppose that every firm in the sample sells 50% of its 
output to foreign clients and buys 10% of its inputs from foreign suppliers. Additionally, 
suppose that final demand (represented by the total sales made by wholesalers) is initially 
equal to 100 monetary units and that one monetary unit of inputs is required to produce 
(and sell) one monetary unit of output at each level of the chain (in other words, firms 
make zero profits and purchase solely industry-specific variable inputs).6 Panel A of 
Figure 4 depicts the flows of domestic and foreign sales and domestic and foreign 
purchases throughout the chain under this numerical example.  
 
[PLEASE insert Figure 4, Panel B here] 
 
Now consider what happens to the flows of sales and purchases throughout the chain as  
final demand (measured by total sales of wholesalers) goes up by one unit (1%). The 
outcome is reported in Panel B of Figure 4. Comparing Panel A and Panel B of Table 4, 
one may compute the absolute and relative variations in total sales and total purchases 
experienced by firms at each level of the chain. The results are reported in Table 10. 
 
[PLEASE insert Table 10, here] 
 
If one would fit the Output-Imput Demand Transmission equation using “Total Sales” or 
“Total Sales per Firm” at each level of the chain as a proxy for chain-level demand, it 
would estimate a slope coefficient of less than 1. Specifically, it would estimate a 
coefficient of 0,9 if the regression was run in monetary units and 0,5 if it was run in 
percentage units. Similar results would obtain under either the “Total Cost of Goods 
                                                 
6 Results don’t change qualitatively if firms make positive profits and use general imputs in addition to 
industry-specific imputs. 
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Sold” proxy or the “Total Cost of Goods Sold per Firm” proxy.7This example shows that 
the downward bias in the estimated coefficients is proportional to the imports-total 
purchases ratio if the regression is run in monetary units and proportional to the exports-
total sales ratio if it’s run in percentage units. 
 
The estimated coefficients resulting from fitting such regression to our sample bear out 
this conjecture. Table 11 reports results from estimating the Output-Imput Demand 
Transmission equation with the variable “Average Sales of firms from level k in year t” 
proxying for “Demand faced by firms from level k in year t”. Variables are indexed - 
taking the value 100 in year 2000 – to run the regression in percentage units. To capture 
chain-threshold fixed effect, the estimation is run with intersect dummies for the various 
levels of the chain.  
 
[PLEASE insert Table 11 here] 
 
The estimated slope coefficient in Table 11 is 0.69, providing evidence of a substantial 
“leakage” of sales within the chain to foreign clients. This is consistent with data from the 
Italian National Association of Textile and Clothing Industry (Sistema Moda Italia, SMI), 
which reports high export-to-sales ratios for the industry as a whole and across all levels 
of the supply chain. Table 12 provides data for 2006 gathered from scattered publications  
of the SMI. 
 
[PLEASE insert Table 12 here] 
 
If one assumes a conservative ratio of exports to total sales of 40% at each level of the 
chain, then a rough estimate of the true coefficient of demand propagation across 
consecutive levels of the supply chain is (1/0.6)*0.69 = 1.15. A coefficient greater than 
one is consistent with the standard bullwhip effect reported in the operations’ 
                                                 
7 As far as the Demand-Operating Cash Flow Transmission equation is considered, its estimated coefficient 
will only biased downward if the regression is based on Cost of Goods Sold. If one uses Sales (or average 
Sales) no external trade-induced bias should occur. 
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management literature, which posits an amplification of demand shocks along a supply 
chain .8 In the rest of the paper, we designate this value as the “external trade-adjusted” 
estimated coefficient of demand propagation. 
 
[PLEASE insert Table 13, Panel A here] 
 
[PLEASE insert Table 13, Panel B here] 
 
Table 13 reports results from fitting the Demand - Operating Cash Flow Transmission 
Equation. In Panel A we present firm-level regressions of EBITDA –scaled by the firm’s 
total assets – on average firm Sales in the corresponding level of the chain. The latter 
variable is indexed, taking the value 100 in year 2000. Panel B contains chain-level 
regressions of  average firm EBITDA on average firm Sales. Both variables are indexed, 
taking the value 100 in year 2000. 
 
The results show that at each level of the chain aggregate sales have a significantly 
positive impact on firms’ operating flow, as expected.  
 
The last missing link the “structural” approach is the Within-Firm Liquidity Transmission 
Equation. However, this equation has already been estimated in section 3 of the paper – 
see Table 5 for firm-level results and Table 8 for chain-level results - when we were 
seeking to pin down the multiplier effect of trade credit.  
 
We may now bring together the separate pieces, interacting the three structural equations 
to gauge the impact of final demand – i.e., the demand faced by wholesalers – on the 
level of trade credit sourced from suppliers at each level of the chain. We evaluate such 
impact using both the firm-level approach and the chain-level approach explained before, 
relying whenever possible on the estimated coefficients from pooled regressions. 
 
                                                 
8 Evidence of amplification of demand variability along a supply chain has been found for the automobile 
industry (Blanchard, [1983]), the  machine tool industry (Anderson et al., [2000]) and the semiconductor 
industry (Terwiesch at al., [2005]).  
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The firm-level approach, however, requires one more assumption to be operative. The 
Within Firm Liquidity Transmission Equation posits that the level of trade credit sourced 
by an individual  firm from its suppliers depends on the level of trade credit granted by 
the firm to its customers (i.e., the so-called Trade Debit). To capture the interconnection 
of trade credit along the supply chain we need to establish the linkage between the trade 
credit granted to customers by individual firms at one level of the chain and the trade 
credit sourced from suppliers by individual firms at the next downstream level of the 
chain. One simple assumption is that  
 
Trade Debit/Salesfirm i,level k  = ak + TradeCredit/COGSfirm j, level k-1 + u                (6) 
 
where i an j are two randomly selected firms from adjacent levels of the chain (k and k-1) 
and u is a random variable with an expected value equal to zero. 
 
Under this assumption, an increase of one unit in the ratio TradeCredit/CGS of a 
randomly selected firm from level k-1 of the chain produces, on average, an increment of 
one unit on the ratio Trade Debit/Sales of a randomly selected firm form level k of the 
chain (i.e., the next upstream level of the chain).9  
 
[PLEASE insert Table 14, here] 
 
Table 14 summarizes the overall effect of an unitary increase in the aggregate sales of 
wholesalers on the level of trade payables at successive upstream levels of the chain. 
Panel A reports results using the firm-level estimation approach whereas Panel B reports 
results under the chain-level approach.  
 
                                                 
9 Notice that such an assumption is not required under the chain-level estimation approach since, by 
definition, the aggregate amount of trade credit granted to customers by firms at one level of the chain 
ought to be equal to the aggregate amount of trade credit sourced from suppliers by firms at the next 
downstream level of the chain.  
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The last column in either panel  – labeled Total Impact – adds up the direct impact arising 
from the demand channel: 
 
final demand→level-k demand→level-k operating cash flow→level-k trade payables  (7) 
 
with the indirect impact arising from the upstream propagation of liquidity shocks via the 
trade credit channel, i.e.: 
 
level-k-1 trade payables→level-k trade payables                                                             (8) 
 
In either case we see evidence of a bullwhip effect, with firms further upstream in the 
chain experiencing greater reductions in trade payables (as a fraction of CGS). The effect 
is also economically significant: a unitary increase in wholesalers’ sales produces an 
effect on the trade payables of firms at the top of the chain (i.e., Preparers and Spinners) 
that is more than twice as big as the corresponding effect on firms at the bottom of the 
chain (i.e., Wholesalers). 
 
The intuition for this result is simple. An increase in the demand for the industry’s final 
good raises the demand for all intermediate goods. As sales at all levels of the chain go 
up, operating cash flow  goes up as well thus generating extra liquidity which firms use to 
reduce their trade payables to suppliers.  This is the direct effect. Firms, however, further 
reduce the credit sourced from suppliers as their customers cut down their own demand 
for credit. This is the indirect effect. Hence, if the direct effect hits all firms along the 
chain in a similar fashion, the indirect effect guarantees that firms further up in the chain 
undergo a greater contraction in trade payables. That means we could reduce the 
“external trade-adjusted” coefficient of demand propagation from 1,15 to 1 and still find 





To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that examines the trade credit 
linkages among firms within a supply chain and reckons the effect of such linkages on 
the propagation of liquidity shocks from downstream to upstream firms. We chose a 
sample appropriate for this task, consisting of a large data set of Italian firms from the 
textile industry, a well known example of a comprehensive manufacturing cluster 
featuring a large number of small and specialized firms at each level of the manufacturing 
process. 
 
The results of the analysis indicate that the level of trade credit that firms provide to their 
suppliers is positively related to the level of trade credit granted to their clients: when the 
level of trade credit granted to clients divided by sales goes up by 1, the level of trade 
credit provided to suppliers divided by cost-of-goods-sold goes up by an amount that 
varies between 0.22 and 0.52. Since all firms along the chain are linked by trade credit 
relationships, an increase in the level of trade credit granted by wholesalers generates a 
liquidity cascade throughout the chain. We designate the overall increase in the level of 
trade credit among all firms in the chain as a result of a unitary impulse in the level of 
trade credit granted by wholesales as the multiplier effect of trade credit for the industry 
chain. We estimate such multiplier to vary between 1.28 and 2.04. 
 
We further investigate how shocks to the industry’s final demand impact on the amount 
of trade credit sourced by firms at various levels of the chain. Specifically, we examine 
whether a bullwhip effect occurs such that firms further up in the chain see wider swings 
in trade payables than their downstream counterparts. Although we fail to detect such an 
effect using a reduced-form estimation approach, under a structural-equation approach in 
which the links of liquidity transmission along the chain are modeled and individually 
estimated we find evidence of it in the data. Our structural estimates indicate that the 
effect of a unitary increase in wholesalers’ sales on the trade payables of firms at the top 
of the chain (i.e., Preparers and Spinners) is more than twice as big as the corresponding 
effect on firms at the bottom of the chain (i.e., Wholesalers).   
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Directions for future empirical research are at two levels: 1) split the data over different 
Italian regions given it is more likely to find and examine the trade credit linkages within 
a supply chain to consider the effect of such linkages on the propagation of liquidity 
shocks from downstream to upstream firms. Specially the North of Italy (Emilia-
Romagna, Lombardia, Trentino-Alto Adige, Friuli, Liguria, Piemonte and Veneto) where 
more than 70 percent of textile firms are located. It this procedure more accurate results 
could be obtained. 2) Exclude from the supply chain analysis the Finishing Textiles level 
for two main reasons: a) it is the level with the lowest number of firms in the sample, 
which can induce that other firms in different levels over the supply chain could already 
include this “service”, b) as it can be seen from the correlation matrix is the level with 
lowest relationship with the upstream and downstream levels of the supply chain. With 
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Figure 1: Textile Production Chain 
 
171 Preparation and spinning of textile fibres 
 
172 Textile weaving 
 
174 Manufacture of made-up textile articles, except apparel; 
175 Manufacture of other textiles; 
176 Manufacture of knitted and crocheted fabrics 
177 Manufacture of knitted and crocheted hosiery 
 
 
173 Finishing Textiles 
 




Table 1: Number of firm year observations by Year 
The panel data set is unbalanced as there are more observations for some firms than for 
others. The table shows the number of observations by year and steps 
 
Wholesales of Textiles 
         
Steps (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Years         
1998 606 332 330 194 194 188 181 180 
1999 606 356 356 196 195 187 178 178 
2000 606 399 397 213 209 201 196 196 
2001 606 411 409 217 215 204 199 197 
2002 606 480 476 234 230 219 214 211 
2003 606 495 489 275 271 259 246 243 
2004 606 552 550 242 241 229 223 221 
2005 606 562 555 476 472 451 432 431 
2006 606 280 280 219 215 204 196 196 
         




Table 2: Manufacture of Textiles 
The panel data set is unbalanced as there are more observations for some firms than for 
others. The table shows the number of observations by year and steps 
 
Panel A: Finishing textiles (NACE 173) 
         
Steps (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Years         
1998 385 239 237 171 171 170 170 169 
1999 385 258 255 173 173 171 168 167 
2000 385 281 279 183 178 176 172 171 
2001 385 286 284 184 179 179 174 174 
2002 385 322 320 192 192 191 187 187 
2003 385 325 323 217 216 216 200 200 
2004 385 360 359 192 191 190 179 178 
2005 385 364 364 314 312 310 293 290 
2006 385 161 161 118 118 118 117 117 
         
All 3,465 2,596 2,582 1,744 1,730 1,721 1,660 1,653 
 
Panel B: Manufacture of made-up textile articles, except apparel; manufacture of 
other textiles; manufacture of knitted and crocheted fabrics manufacture of knitted 
and crocheted hosiery (NACE 174-177) 
         
Steps (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Years         
1998 1,248 713 703 476 474 466 457 457 
1999 1,248 779 775 522 519 514 502 502 
2000 1,248 840 835 521 518 513 504 504 
2001 1,248 873 868 529 526 521 511 510 
2002 1,248 1030 1023 582 575 567 551 545 
2003 1,248 1043 1038 640 630 623 583 579 
2004 1,248 1151 1146 604 600 594 571 566 
2005 1,248 1149 1146 991 983 973 924 917 
2006 1,248 519 519 425 421 417 409 408 
         




Panel C: Textile weaving (NACE 172) 
         
Steps (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Years         
1998 867 608 606 452 450 446 432 431 
1999 867 660 658 487 483 480 461 461 
2000 867 697 696 475 466 459 445 445 
2001 867 704 702 486 483 479 471 471 
2002 867 762 761 500 497 495 485 484 
2003 867 774 772 542 541 539 502 501 
2004 867 813 810 489 489 488 478 478 
2005 867 820 820 745 745 738 706 706 
2006 867 374 374 297 297 292 285 284 
         
All 7,803 6,212 6,199 4,473 4,451 4,416 4,265 4,261 
 
 
Panel D: Preparation and spinning of textile fibres (NACE 171) 
         
Steps (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Years         
1998 588 411 407 315 313 308 302 302 
1999 588 439 438 323 321 318 310 309 
2000 588 461 457 312 309 305 301 301 
2001 588 475 473 324 317 311 307 306 
2002 588 511 507 327 321 315 311 308 
2003 588 516 515 370 365 358 337 337 
2004 588 546 543 336 334 328 319 319 
2005 588 543 542 489 483 474 445 444 
2006 588 269 269 214 209 209 206 205 
         
All 5,292 4,171 4,151 3,010 2,972 2,926 2,838 2,831 
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Table 3: Statistical Analysis 
The table presents the mean, median, standard deviation, maximum and minimum by level in the supply chain (wholesalers, Finishing 
Textiles, Manufacture of Textiles, Textile Weaving and Preparation and Spinning of Textile Fibres) 
  Creditors / Cost of Goods Sold  Debtors / Sales 
Wholesalers Years Nr Firms Mean Median Std Dev Max Min  Nr Firms Mean Median Std Dev Max Min 
 1998 180 0.347 0.328 0.190 0.880 0.014  180 0.293 0.291 0.146 0.973 0.004 
 1999 178 0.375 0.362 0.192 0.892 0.010  178 0.317 0.323 0.154 0.920 0.003 
 2000 196 0.391 0.361 0.203 0.938 0.013  196 0.319 0.318 0.155 0.915 0.003 
 2001 197 0.372 0.340 0.207 0.995 0.014  197 0.313 0.307 0.156 0.937 0.002 
 2002 211 0.334 0.310 0.199 0.942 0.014  211 0.314 0.310 0.158 0.984 0.005 
 2003 243 0.375 0.364 0.209 0.990 0.001  243 0.327 0.324 0.170 0.991 0.006 
 2004 221 0.341 0312 0.201 0.969 0.003  221 0.314 0.309 0.159 0.956 0.000 
 2005 431 0.361 0.338 0.199 0.997 0.002  431 0.314 0.307 0.172 0.954 0.000 
 2006 196 0.339 0.321 0.182 0.905 0.011  196 0.325 0.340 0.150 0.821 0.002 
               
NACE Years Nr Firms Mean Median Std Dev Max Min  Nr Firms Mean Median Std Dev Max Min 
Finishing Textiles 1998 169 0.339 0.314 0.152 0.917 0.098  169 0.296 0.307 0.136 0.657 0.008 
 1999 167 0.348 0.321 0.155 0.910 0.055  167 0.310 0.323 0.146 0.773 0.008 
 2000 171 0.346 0.321 0.148 0.917 0.066  171 0.319 0.337 0.135 0.643 0.002 
 2001 174 0.353 0.322 0.154 0.950 0.045  174 0.315 0.340 0.141 0.922 0.001 
 2002 187 0.359 0.331 0.175 0.990 0.040  187 0.320 0.337 0.153 0.966 0.000 
 2003 200 0.368 0.316 0.194 0.996 0.041  200 0.310 0.318 0.140 0.709 0.001 
 2004 178 0.332 0.299 0.157 0.963 0.059  178 0.329 0.348 0.138 0.722 0.002 
 2005 290 0.361 0.321 0.172 0.972 0.049  290 0.331 0.333 0.140 0.833 0.001 
 2006 117 0.337 0.305 0.152 0.836 0.112  117 0.365 0.364 0.157 0.863 0.002 
 31
 
  Creditors / Cost of Goods Sold  Debtors / Sales 
Manufacture of Textiles  Years Nr Firms Mean Median Std Dev Max Min  Nr Firms Mean Median Std Dev Max Min 
 1998 457 0.404 0.381 0.176 0.936 0.031  457 0.299 0.290 0.141 0.859 0.005 
 1999 502 0.426 0.405 0.173 0.957 0.033  502 0.316 0.309 0.144 0.798 0.002 
 2000 504 0.428 0.408 0.172 0.982 0.008  504 0.318 0.312 0.144 0.857 0.000 
 2001 510 0.413 0.397 0.177 0.986 0.034  510 0.315 0.300 0.157 0.958 0.003 
 2002 545 0.425 0.400 0.188 0.999 0.037  545 0.324 0.305 0.158 0.983 0.001 
 2003 579 0.420 0.391 0.186 0.995 0.012  579 0.329 0.313 0.160 0.942 0.003 
 2004 566 0.415 0.383 0.195 0.993 0.024  566 0.337 0.329 0.161 0.968 0.002 
 2005 917 0.428 0.399 0.198 0.999 0.014  917 0.346 0.331 0.165 0.989 0.001 
 2006 408 0.415 0.381 0.198 0.993 0.016  408 0.340 0.329 0.159 0.899 0.003 
               
Textile Weaving Years Nr Firms Mean Median Std Dev Max Min  Nr Firms Mean Median Std Dev Max Min 
 1998 431 0.412 0.401 0.186 0.990 0.012  431 0.294 0.287 0.124 0.881 0.000 
 1999 461 0.452 0.442 0.190 0.971 0.017  461 0.315 0.306 0.133 0.871 0.001 
 2000 445 0.444 0.435 0.183 0.965 0.024  445 0.313 0.307 0.124 0.841 0.000 
 2001 471 0.412 0.393 0.181 0.952 0.006  471 0.293 0.288 0.126 0.762 0.000 
 2002 484 0.429 0.407 0.190 0.982 0.025  484 0.307 0.295 0.129 0.849 0.001 
 2003 501 0.432 0.410 0.199 0.989 0.015  501 0.317 0.312 0.127 0.915 0.001 
 2004 478 0.431 0.408 0.194 1.000 0.011  478 0.324 0.321 0.130 0.841 0.002 
 2005 706 0.446 0.422 0.205 0.997 0.016  706 0.334 0.321 0.152 0.974 0.000 
 2006 284 0.435 0.417 0.203 0.994 0.007  284 0.330 0.330 0.146 0.885 0.004 
 32
 
  Creditors / Cost of Goods Sold  Debtors / Sales 
Preparation and Spinning Years Nr Firms Mean Median Std Dev Max Min  Nr Firms Mean Median Std Dev Max Min 
of Textile fibres 1998 302 0.352 0.330 0.179 0.963 0.034  302 0.278 0.277 0.137 0.691 0.001 
 1999 309 0.394 0.358 0.197 0.964 0.000  309 0.310 0.309 0.148 0.854 0.001 
 2000 301 0.379 0.349 0.186 0.997 0.062  301 0.309 0.307 0.146 0.919 0.001 
 2001 306 0.351 0.335 0.165 0.949 0.059  306 0.295 0.287 0.140 0.891 0.001 
 2002 308 0.361 0.332 0.168 0.979 0.021  308 0.303 0.306 0.132 0.780 0.001 
 2003 337 0.373 0.336 0.195 0.970 0.049  337 0.314 0.310 0.153 0.999 0.000 
 2004 319 0.344 0.335 0.164 0.909 0.041  319 0.326 0.328 0.145 0.846 0.000 
 2005 444 0.375 0.347 0.192 0.954 0.011  444 0.338 0.335 0.162 0.997 0.001 




































Table 4: Correlation Matrix 
The table shows the correlation coefficients between Cost-of-Goods-Sold, at each level of 
the chain, and Sales at further upstream levels of the chain. The diagonal cells correspond 
to adjacent levels of the chain whereas the off-diagonal cells correspond to non-adjacent  










Preparation and spinning 
of textile fibres 
Wholesalers 
 
0.3834 0.7159 0.7666 0.7794 
Finishing Textiles 
 
 0.3008 0.2693 0.5950 
Manufacture of Textiles 
 
  0.9505 0.6901 
Textile Weaving    0.8016 
 
 
Table 5: Within-Firm Liquidity Transmission Equation (variables levels) 
This table regresses trade credit sourced from suppliers on the trade credit granted to 
customers and with the operating cash-flow, using firm-level observations. 
The model is written as: 
(Trade Credit/CGS)it = α + β1(Trade Debit/Sales)it + β2 (EBITDA/Total Assets)it + uit 
 
Regressions by level of supply chain 
 Α β1 β2 N Adj. R2 








































t-statistics in parentheses 
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Pooled regression (all firms, with intersect dummies for the various levels of the supply 
chain; dummy coefficients not reported) 
 Α β1 β2 N Adj. R2 
      





t-statistics in parentheses 
 
Table 6: Within-Firm Liquidity Transmission Equation (variables changes) 
This table regresses for every level of the chain, the change in the level of credit granted 
to clients in the level of trade credit borrowed from suppliers. 
 
The Model is written as: 
(Trade Credit/CGS)it – (Trade Credit/CGS)i t-1 = α + β1 [(Trade Debit/Sales)it – (Trade 
Debit/Sales)i t-1] + β2 [(EBITDA/Total Assets)it -(EBITDA/Total Assets)i t-1] + uit 
 
Regressions by level of supply chain 
 α β1 β2 N Adj. R2 








































t-statistics in parentheses 
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Pooled regression (all firms, with intersect dummies for the various levels of the supply 
chain; dummy coefficients not reported) 
 
 Α Β1 β2 N Adj. R2 
      







t-statistics in parentheses 
 
 
Table 7: Liquidity Contagion Effect of Trade Credit (Quartiles) 
This table tests whether the access to bank debt mitigates the liquidity contagion effect of 
trade credit. Firms are ranked using the volume of sales. 
 
The model is written as  
(Trade Credit/CGS)it = α + β1 (Trade Debit/Sales)it + β2 (EBITDA/Total Assets)it + uit 
 
Regressions by level of supply chain 
 α β1 β2 N Adj. R2 
      
Wholesalers 






















      
Finishing Textiles  























      
Manufacture of Textiles 














































      
Preparation and Spinning of Textile 
Fibres 
























t-statistics in parentheses 
 
 
Pooled regression (all firms, with intersect dummies for the various levels of the supply 
chain; dummy coefficients not reported) 
 
 α β1 β2 N Adj. R2 



















Table 8: Chain-threshold level Results 
This table captures how the average level of trade credit at one level of the chain varies 
with the average level of trade credit at the next downstream level of the chain 
 
The model is written as: 
(Average Trade Credit/CGS)level k,t  = a + β1(average Trade Credit/CGS)level k+1,t + β2 
(EBITDA/Total Assets) level k,t  + uit 
 
Regressions by level of supply chain 
 Α β1 β2 N Adj R2 
      
k= Finishing Textiles 










k= Manufacture Textiles 










k= Textile Weaving 










k= Preparation and Spinning if Textile 
Fibres 








t-statistics in parentheses 
 
 
Pooled regression (all levels, with intersect dummies for the various levels of the supply 
chain; dummy coefficients not reported) 
 α β1 β 2 N Adj R2 











Table 9 - Reduced form estimation of the bullwhip effect of trade credit 
 
Panel A: Firm Level Approach 
(Trade Payables/Cost of Goods Sold)firm i, level k, year t = α +β1 Average Sales of 
Wholesalersyear t + β2 k Average Sales of Wholesalersyear t + u  
 
 Α β1 β2 N Adj R2 







t-statistics in parentheses 
 
Panel B: Chain-Level Approach 
Average Trade Payableslevel k, year t =   
α + β1 Average Sales of Wholesalersyear t + β2 k Average Sales of Wholesalersyear t + u  
 
 Α β1 β2 N Adj R2 














Figure 3 – Impact of Final Demand on Trade Credit Sourced by Firms from 
Suppliers at Each Level of the Supply Chain 
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Figure 4 - Numerical Example of External Trade Leakages in the Supply Chain 
It is assumed that (i) all imputs used by firms are variable and industry specific; (ii) firms 
make zero profits; (iii) firms export 50% of output; and (iv) firms import 10% of imputs. 
Final Demand is initially equal to 100 m.u. (Panel A), increasing to 101 m.u.in Panel B.                    
                         










   Domestic Purchases(90) 
 
Manufacturing 
   Foreign 
 Purchases (10)  
     Foreign  
     sales(90) 
Weaving 










      Foreign  





















  Foreign 
 sales(524,9) 
    Foreign 
 Purchases(18) 
   Foreign 
   Purchases(32,4) 
Foreign 
 Purchases(58,3) 










   Domestic Purchases(90,9) 
 
Manufacturing 
   Foreign 
 Purchases (10,1)  
      Foreign  
      sales(90) 
Weaving 




















      Foreign  










       Foreign  







Panel A Panel B 
 42
 
Table 10 - Effect of a variation in “Aggregate Sales of Wholesaling Firms” on the 
level of “Aggregate Sales” and “Aggregate Purchases” at successive upstream levels 
of the supply chain  
 
Level of Supply Chain Variation Total Sales 
(domestic+foreign) 
Variation Total Purchases 
(domestic+foreign) 
Wholesalers 1 m.u. (1%) 1 m.u. (1%) 
Finishers 0,9 m.u. (0,5%) 0,9 m.u. (0,5%) 
Manufacturers 0,81 m.u. (0,25%) 0,81 m.u. (0,25%) 
Weavers 0,729 m.u. (0,125%) 0,729 m.u. (0,125%) 
Spinners 0,6561 m.u. (0,0625%) 0,6561 m.u. (0,0625%) 
 
 
Table 11: Output-Imput Demand Transmission Equation 
This table reports the results from estimating the output-input demand transmission 
equation with the variable “Average Sales of firms from level K in year t”. 
 
The model can be written as: 
Average Salesk,t = αk + β Average Salesk-1,t + uit 
(Intersect dummies used for the various levels of the supply chain; dummy coefficients 
not reported) 
 








Table 12: Turnover and Export Data for the Italian Textile&Clothing Industry in 
2006 (Turnover and Exports in billions of euros) 
 Turnover Exports Exports/Turnover 
Spinning (filature) 
Yarn or thread of cotton, wool and linen 
3,4 1,12 33% 
Weaving (tessitura) 
Fabrics of cotton, wool, linen, silk. 
9,1 6 66,5% 
Manufacturing 
• Clothing (clothing items, knitwear, hosiery) 














Finishing 4,8 4 83% 
Total Industry (excludes wholesaling) 53 27,6 52,2% 
Source: Sistema Moda Italia (Centri Studi) 
 
 
Table 13: Demand-Operating Cash Flow Transmission Equation 
 
The model can be written as: 
(EBITDA/Total Assets)i,k,t = αk + β Average Salesk,t + uit 
 
Panel A: Firm Level Estimation 
Regressions by level of supply chain 


























t-statistics in parentheses 
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Pooled regression (all firms, with intersect dummies for the various levels of the supply 
chain; dummy coefficients not reported) 
 
 α β N Adj. R2 





t-statistics in parentheses 
 
Panel B: Chain-level Threshold Estimation 
Model: Average EBITDAk,t = αk + β Average Salesk,t + uit 










t-statistics in parentheses 
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Table 14 - Effect of a unitary increase in aggregate sales of wholesalers on the level of trade credit sourced from suppliers 
(ratio Trade Payables/CGS) at successive upstream levels of the supply chain  




Direct impact of final demand on trade credit sourced by 
firms at level k of the supply chain 
Indirect impact of final demand on trade credit sourced by 








(Table 11 with 
coefficient 




Impact of level-k  
Demand on ratio 
(Operating  
Cash Flow / Assets) 
of firm i at level k of 
chain 
(Table 13 – Panel A; 
pooled regression) 
(B) 
Impact of ratio 
(Operating  
Cash Flow/Assets) on 
ratio   
(TradeCredit/CGS) 
for firm i at level k of 
chain 







Direct impact of 




of firm i at level k-
1 of the chain 
(E) 
Impact of ratio 
(TradeCredit/CGS) of 
random firm from level 
k-1 of chain on ratio 
(Trade debit/Sales) of 
random firm from level 
k of chain  
(Equation (6)) 
(F) 
Impact of ratio  
(Trade Debit/Sales) on 
ratio (Trade 
Credit/CGS) for random 
firm from level k of the 
chain   











1 0,0005 -0,22 -0,00011 0 1 0,22 0 -0,00011 
Finishers 
(173; k=1) 
1,15 0,0005 -0,22 - 0,0001265 -0,00011 1 0,22  -0,0000242 -0,000151 
Manufacturers 
(174/177; k=2) 
1,152 0,0005 -0,22 - 0,0001454 -0,0001265 1 0,22 -0,0000278 -0,000173 
Weavers 
(171; k=3) 




1,154 0,0005 -0,22 -0,0001922 - 0,0001672 1 0,22 -0,0000367 -0,000229 
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Direct impact of final demand on trade credit sourced by 
firms at level k of the supply chain 
Indirect impact of final demand on trade credit 
sourced by firms at level k of the supply chain, 
arising from trade credit propagation 
Total 
Impact 
 Impact of 
Wholesaler’s  
Demand on level-k 
Demand 
(Table 11 with 
coefficient adjusted 
for  external trade 
bias) 
(A) 
Impact of level-k  
Demand on average 
Operating  
Cash Flow  
among level-k firms  
(Table 13 – Panel B) 
(B) 
Impact of average 
Operating Cash Flow 
among level-k firms 
on average ratio 
(Trade Credit/CGS) 
among level-k firms 







Direct impact of 






Impact of average ratio 
(TradeCredit/CGS) among  (k-1)-
level  firms on average ratio 
(TradeCrdit/CGS) among k-level 
firms   
(Table 8; β1 pooled regression) 
(F) 
Indirect Impact 
(G) =(E)(F)  (H)=(D)+(G) 
Wholesalers 
(k=0) 
1 0,93 -0,0001 -0,000093  0,52 0 -0,000093 
Finishers 
(173; k=1) 
1,15 0,93 -0,0001 -0,000107 -0,000093 0,52 -0,000048 -0,000155 
Manufacturers 
(174/177; k=2) 
1,152 0,93 -0,0001 -0,000123 -0,000107 0,52 -0,000056 -0,000179 
Weavers 
(171; k=3) 




1,154 0,93 -0,0001 -0,000162 -0,000141 0,52 -0,000073 -0,000235 
 
 
